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ABSTRACT ■ What are the institutional prerequisites for the creation and
maintenance of centralized collective bargaining and social pacts? This
article compares Greek experience since 1990 with that in other countries,
arguing that societies are likely to diverge on how they respond to the issues
of changing bargaining structure and tripartite policy-making. While 
neo-institutionalist approaches, and particularly their ‘varieties of capitalism’
variant, can go a long way in interpreting these diverse responses, they have
problems accounting for institutional change. To accomplish this we need a
more dynamic understanding of how past institutional arrangements in
combination with current tensions over particular issues, and the costs and
opportunities presented to actors, give rise to distinctive responses.
KEYWORDS: collective bargaining ■ Greece ■ institutionalism ■ social pact ■
variety of capitalism
Introduction
The breakdown in the 1980s of neo-corporatist arrangements, prevalent
in many western European societies, encouraged social scientists to
proclaim the end of centralized collective bargaining and social pact
agreements, with a convergence towards decentralized bargaining driven
by market forces. An underlying assumption of convergence theories is
that technological restructuring and economic internationalization have
weakened labour and rendered centralized bargaining obsolete.
Moreover, it is believed that globalization and labour market restructur-
ing necessitate cutbacks in public welfare and greater reliance on market
mechanisms.
However, such claims have been widely questioned, particularly from
the neo-institutionalist perspective (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall and
Soskice, 2001; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Kitschelt et al., 1999;
Soskice, 1999). While all European countries have experienced pressure
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to reform their labour relations and social security systems, the direction
of reform has not been uniform across countries. Moreover, the mechan-
isms employed to carry out reform have differed, in turn affecting the
outcome. Not only does coordinated collective bargaining persist in
many countries (Golden et al., 1999), but there was a widespread revival
of concertation and social pacts in the 1990s as the basis for social and
economic reforms (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000; Regini and Regalia,
1997; Rhodes, 1997; Royo, 2002).
Against this background, this article examines two interrelated
developments in Greece since 1990: collective bargaining arrangements,
and attempts to reform employment arrangements and the social security
system through social pacts. It is argued that institutionalist perspectives
are better suited in explaining recent developments than convergence
theories, but there needs to be a more dynamic understanding of how
past institutional arrangements in combination with changing economic
circumstances and shifts in the balance of power affect social actors’
responses. Particular emphasis is placed on the circumstances under
which actors are likely to exhibit ‘institutional learning’. Before turning
to the empirical investigation of these issues we briefly consider argu-
ments put forward from the neo-institutionalist perspective as a basis for
understanding developments in collective bargaining and concerted
policy-making.
The Role of Institutional Arrangements
Neo-institutionalist perspectives stress the need to focus on the variety
of social and economic arrangements present in contemporary capitalist
societies: countries respond differently to economic challenges according
to prior institutional arrangements. This implies that there are choices to
be made in economic governance, even if many of these choices are
circumscribed by current institutional arrangements.
The main proposition underlying this perspective is that actors’ behav-
iour is path-dependent, meaning that previous shaping of institutions
steers responses to problems and challenges in a particular direction. The
most common definition of institutions is that of North (1990), as norms
and rules of the game that guide the structuring of organizations. Insti-
tutions are historical constructs that shape the way interests are struc-
tured; the institutional arrangements of a society coordinate economic
actors and provide the tools, resources and cognitive frameworks that
allow them to respond to challenges (Hollingsworth, 2002;
Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997).
One of the main institutionalist arguments is that the state, formal
associations (for example unions) and informal networks are just as
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important as markets in economic governance: their interventions modify
the performance of markets and hence firms’ behaviour. In particular,
institutions are a mechanism of instilling trust. But some societies are in
this sense more institutional than others, with arrangements other than
markets playing a greater role in economic governance (Crouch and
Streeck, 1997).
Following Soskice (1990, 1999), neo-institutionalists commonly distin-
guish between coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany,
and liberal market economies (LMEs), such as Britain and the USA. The
primary difference between these two types centres on the degree to
which economic activities are determined by market forces as opposed to
other coordinating mechanisms. Emphasis is placed on how firms and
business associations interact and pool resources. Within CMEs, firms
coordinate their activities on such matters as wages, training programmes
and research, while the state sets the framework within which this is
accomplished. Industrial relations are coordinated through employer and
labour associations on a national and/or sectoral level. By contrast, in
LMEs firms lack centralized organizations and coordinating mechanisms
and rely much more heavily on market mechanisms to generate the
necessary resources. Within these economies labour relations are decen-
tralized, and deregulated labour markets prevail.
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) approach differs from previous
attempts to categorize countries by their institutional characteristics, and
particularly from the neo-corporatist literature, in that convergence is not
expected. While the VoC approach does not primarily focus on forms of
collective bargaining and policy-making, it provides insights as to why
societies differ on these dimensions. Moreover, it improves on the neo-
corporatist literature by considering factors other than the organizational
strength of labour (see also Regini, 2003). For example, in CMEs it is
employers who seek coordination and centralized bargaining as the best
way of achieving their economic goals. In contrast, in LMEs firms are not
in a position to build institutional structures to incorporate labour, which
has led governments to reduce the influence of unions and impose change
unilaterally (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Soskice 1990, 1999). This approach
is particularly relevant to understanding recent social pacts, because
unlike the corporatist policy-making of the 1970s, today’s efforts are not
a result of labour’s strength but of increased competitive pressures that
drive governments to cut back on welfare spending and limit labour’s
bargaining position in the labour market (Ferner and Hyman, 1998).
The virtues of the VoC approach notwithstanding, there are also
certain shortcomings. It has little power to explain change or to account
for variations in policy-making not only between but also within
countries (Regini, 2000). An underlying assumption is that the prevailing
institutional arrangements will persist: CMEs are expected to remain
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organized, regulatory and socially supportive, so that reforms occur
through cooperation and concertation between the state and collective
associations. LMEs, on the other hand, are expected to weaken further
their regulatory mechanisms and social supports (Kitschelt et al., 1999).
Moreover, policies enacted in different areas are believed to be inter-
dependent and complementary, and tied to a particular national cultural
style. In short, responses to current economic challenges are expected to
follow the logic inherent in their respective production systems. In
reality, however, policy responses are rarely reached without tension and
there is rarely only one outcome available.
Part of the problem emerges from the fact that the VoC literature
focuses on a limited number of countries that are very close to the ideal-
type models constructed. In these countries it has been common for
policies enacted to be complementary and consistent, and to reflect the
predominant policy style. In part this was the case because both the
CMEs and the LMEs examined were considered relatively successful, and
as a result there was little pressure for institutional change. However, this
has been changing during recent years and even countries like Germany
are experiencing increased pressure to introduce reforms that challenge
some of the existing institutional arrangements.
In addition, when one examines countries that do not fit neatly into
either the CME or LME categories, and particularly countries where
policy failure has been common, such policy consistency is rarely
observed. Moreover, where ‘policy failure’ is identified tensions are likely
to arise over the adjustments to be made, and responses will deviate from
the current path. This has been the case in many countries of southern
Europe, where social pacts for introducing reforms have been widely
used, even though these countries do not share those institutional charac-
teristics that are commonly identified with concerted policy-making.
Some parallels may also be noted in central and eastern Europe.
For the dynamics of change to be better understood, a more fine-
grained analysis of institutional arrangements is needed, as well as a better
understanding of what motivates actors’ responses to change. While these
are in part shaped by pre-existing institutional arrangements, changing
circumstances and shifts in the balance of power are likely to encourage
actors to interpret reality in a new frame. Policy outcomes are much more
likely to be the joint result of past institutional arrangements and path-
dependent behaviour, on the one hand, and, on the other, the tensions and
frictions arising between those sectors of society seeking change and
those wanting to preserve existing arrangements (Berger and Dore, 1996).
Change will be harder where institutional arrangements are deeply
embedded and are supported by a wide section of the population. In
contrast, where the rules of the game are less explicit, political conflicts
and power relations assume a greater weight in decision-making. In order
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to have a better understanding of the dynamics of change, the role of
political actors and particularly of the party system in mediating social
conflicts must be considered; such factors are very important in deter-
mining the type of adjustment policies pursued and their chances of
success.
The following section will outline some of the distinguishing features
of the system of economic governance that has prevailed in Greece.
Recent developments in collective bargaining and attempts at concerted
policy-making are then examined.1 Finally, Greek experience is placed in
comparative perspective in order to gain a better understanding of the
factors leading countries to adopt different strategies for coping with
similar challenges.
A System of State-led Coordination?
Greece is closer to what has been termed ‘state capitalism’ (Boyer, 1997;
Schmidt, 2002) than to either the CME or the LME model. In this variant
of capitalism the state plays an active role in economic development,
mediates relationships between firms, and between firms and financial
capital, and determines industrial relations outcomes. However, in
Greece, as in most South European countries, the state lacks the insti-
tutional capacity to ensure economic efficiency. Moreover, southern
Europe also displays weak social protection, lack of cooperation between
social partners and inequality of incomes and opportunities.
In Greece, late economic development combined with strong
economic protection and suppressed wages, at least up until 1974,
hindered the growth of competitive industries. The state intervened in the
economy through numerous subsidies and tariffs, and in the 1970s and
1980s through large public enterprises. Economic development was
largely concentrated in small, labour-intensive, low added-value firms
and a large service and agricultural sector. In the postwar period, many
firms owed their existence to insulation from foreign competition
through protective legislation and the suppression of wages (Gianitsis,
1988; Tsoukalas, 1987). This situation was reinforced by the presence of
a large black-market economy, estimated at 35 percent of GDP. Despite
the seemingly strong role of the Greek state, it was unable to carry out
the necessary reforms to allow the Greek economy to develop in line with
the rest of Europe (Lymberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002). The clientilist
organization of the political system contributed to policies being to a
large extent determined by particularistic interests of groups that retained
close relationships with the ruling party. Rules and norms were neither
clearly defined nor always observed. While in the 1990s there was a
change in rhetoric and policy, with emphasis on privatization of large
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state enterprises, this has neither changed substantially the overall struc-
ture of the economy, nor has it brought about the desired competitive-
ness of its productive forces.
The model of economic development achieved in Greece was based on
a highly controlled system of collective bargaining, for many years
excluding labour from policy-making. A postwar system of collective
bargaining developed that was highly centralized and controlled by the
state, which retained the right to exercise compulsory arbitration. The
state also intervened to control the leadership of the monopolistic trade
unions (General Confederation of Greek Labour [GSEE] in the private
sector, Chief Directorate of Public Employees Associations [ADEDY] in
the public). These practices were the product of the decades of authori-
tarian rule up to 1974, but persisted even after the transition to democ-
racy; however, such intervention failed to curb union activity, and
accentuated divisions along partisan lines that cut across union organiz-
ations at all levels. The effort by the state to control labour and impose
incomes policies, and the desire by political parties to gain influence
through unions, resulted in highly adversarial labour relations, demon-
strated by the exceptionally high rates of strikes towards the end of the
1970s and for most of the 1980s (Mavrogordatos, 1988; Zambarloukou,
1997).
Unions derived their strength primarily from the fact that they were
tightly connected to the political process, and not from their collective
bargaining capacity. These close ties were often of a clientilist nature and
helped boost unions’ political influence. One of their main sources of
strength derived from the disruptive capacity of certain sections of
labour, particularly in nationalized enterprises, public utilities and
banking. These sectors formed the backbone of the union movement in
the 1980s. In addition to being the most militant, these unions maintained
close political ties to the socialist party (PASOK), which was in power
for most of the 1980s. The eve of the new decade brought about major
changes in collective bargaining procedures accompanied by changes in
the tactics adopted by unions and employers respectively. It is to these
changes that we now turn.
Centralized Collective Bargaining: New Meaning for an
Old Practice
By the 1990s it was clear that the prevailing model of industrial relations
did not deliver the desired outcomes: the politicization of labour conflicts
had allowed important sections of labour to gain concessions from the
state and employers, but, with growing unemployment and budget
deficits, this model was yielding diminishing returns. The government
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sought to disengage from the processes of collective bargaining so that
‘social partners’ could resolve disputes autonomously and thus facilitate
wage restraint, which was necessary for Greece to meet the Maastricht
convergence criteria and increasing economic competition.
A new law in 1990 abolished compulsory arbitration as a means of
resolving disputes and replaced it by a system of mediation, with arbitra-
tion available only if requested by both sides, or by unions when employ-
ers refuse negotiations. Collective bargaining over pay remains highly
centralized, with agreements signed between GSEE and the main
employers’ associations to establish the minimum wage and serve as a
guideline for agreements signed at sectoral, occupational and local levels.
The new law also enables all firms with more than 50 employees to sign
enterprise agreements, impossible for most firms previously.
The abolition of compulsory arbitration has placed pressure on unions
and employers’ associations to negotiate and reach consensus, since they
can no longer rely on the state to intervene in case of deadlock. The first
general agreement reached in 1991 settled for moderate minimum wage
increases over a two-year period; previously one-year agreements were
customary. Under the new arrangements a broader set of issues related
to work organization were discussed, such as hours of work and health
and safety (Mouriki, 2001), allowing greater coordination between the
agreements signed at different levels. Unions have exhibited unprece-
dented moderation by Greek standards: wage increases have been modest
and strike activity has declined substantially (EIROnline, 2003).
Overall there is little indication of decentralization of collective
bargaining, and the total number of agreements signed per year remains
unchanged. However, sectoral agreements seem to be gaining ground
over occupational agreements that predominated before the introduction
of the new law. While bargaining at sectoral level suffers from the
presence of numerous federations (over 60), the truth is that there was
even greater segmentation under the previous arrangements. On the
other hand, there is little indication that enterprise agreements are gaining
ground, even though their signing has been facilitated by the new law:
there was some increase in 2001, but year-to-year fluctuations are
common. A recent survey of Greek firms has shown that 84.5 percent
based the wage rates on sectoral collective agreements and only 0.5
percent on enterprise agreements (Kouzis, 2002).
Appearances are to some extent misleading: the presence of numerous
small enterprises and an undocumented labour force has always meant
that labour relations are less regulated than the official bargaining system
might imply. Moreover, there are large tourist and agricultural sectors
that rely heavily on seasonal employment where it is easy for employers
to use flexible employment arrangements that are not found elsewhere.
This phenomenon is accentuated by a large influx of undocumented
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immigrants. While these developments indicate that Greek labour is
becoming more vulnerable, their negative impact might be restricted by
greater coordination in collective bargaining.
Another development since the introduction of the new law is the
reduction of the number of agreements reached through arbitration. In
the 1980s these represented on average 42 percent of all agreements, but
the proportion fell to about 14 percent of the total.2 It is the weak unions
in the private sector that usually resort to arbitration, when employers
refuse to negotiate and give wage increases along the lines proposed by
the general collective agreements (Koukoules, 1997); no centralized
agreements have been signed through arbitration procedures. Hence
bipartite negotiations are today assuming greater weight than during the
previous decades.
Developments in collective bargaining need to be understood as the
joint result of existing institutional factors and the way unions and
employers interpret the opportunities and costs of alternative options
within the new economic and political context. Both had learned to
organize and promote their interests through centralized associations and
believed that they could defend their interests best if centralized forms of
representation and bargaining were preserved. Furthermore, neither
expected to promote their interests merely through market mechanisms,
given that markets did not act spontaneously but were highly regulated.
The primary role of the state in coordinating all economic activities
encouraged all sides to address their demands or grievances to the
government and to try to enter into a special relationship with political
actors. This enhanced their eagerness to maintain the bargaining role of
their respective national associations.
Unions’ willingness to show moderation needs to be understood
within the context of both the weaknesses of Greek labour and the
changing economic circumstances of the 1990s. As already noted, the
presence of a large unofficial economy and undocumented labour, in
combination with numerous small family-run firms and a large percent-
age of self-employment, has meant that in practice a large section of the
labour force was not unionized and remained outside collective bargain-
ing. In the vast majority of Greek firms unions cannot be formed, since
96 percent of firms employ fewer than 21 employees, which is the
minimum union membership demanded for a union to be established in
an enterprise (Kouzis, 2000). Labour’s position has been further
weakened by technological change and the opening up of the Greek
economy to foreign competition, which has led to the closure of a
number of industrial enterprises. The impact was even greater because
of extensive privatization and the reduced capacity of the state to inter-
vene in economic affairs. These factors, along with rising unemployment
(over 10 percent from the mid-1990s) and declining union density
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(currently about 33 percent), led to the erosion of union strength at
enterprise level.
Unions’ strength had derived mainly from their ability to act in a
coordinated way and from their ties to the political party system. In
contrast, their bargaining power with private employers was not particu-
larly strong and was further weakened as a result of economic crisis and
industrial restructuring. The abolition of centralized bargaining would
have significantly undermined union power and restricted union influ-
ence to a few sectors of the economy. At the same time, it became
apparent to unions that for centralized collective bargaining to be main-
tained and to continue to play an important role, they could not continue
the strategy of confrontation that had prevailed in the past, given that
their capacity to gain concessions through confrontation was severely
limited within the new economic context of the 1990s. Moreover, follow-
ing the abolition of compulsory arbitration, centralized bargaining could
only remain effective if they were willing to accept compromise. The
union leadership needed to find alternative strategies to sustain a central
role in social and political outcomes, and decided to adopt a more consen-
sual and moderate style as part of a strategy. Thus union behaviour can
be seen as shaped in part by previous institutional arrangements that
rested on centralized associations and bargaining, and in part as the result
of ‘institutional learning’, triggered by their weakened labour market
position and their desire to retain political influence. This was facilitated
by a weakening of partisan divisions within the union movement.
Employers also supported the disengagement of the state from collec-
tive bargaining, because they believed that government interference
accentuated industrial conflict and had ceased to be effective in achieving
wage restraint. However, all employers’ organizations, particularly those
representing manufacturing industry, wanted to maintain centralized
collective agreements. They tended to believe that national bargaining by
GSEE was more likely to preserve industrial peace, by restricting the
activity of the more militant union factions, and that national agreements
reduced uncertainty and allowed employers to plan ahead. This was
particularly true if agreements were signed on a two-year basis, as was
customary after 1990. Conversely, bargaining decentralization could lead
to greater uncertainty and tension.
Institutional factors also help explain employers’ continued support
for centralized bargaining: they were organized in centralized associ-
ations and wished to preserve the status and influence of these. This is
particularly true of the Association of Greek Industry, which enjoyed
considerable political leverage. Centralized bargaining provided employ-
ers, like unions, with an important role in economic governance that they
could use to seek concessions from government. In addition, the inter-
ests of the numerous small employers could best be served through
Zambarloukou: Collective Bargaining and Social Pacts
219
centralized associations, since they did not have the direct access to the
state which many large employers enjoyed. At the same time, the
presence of a large unofficial economy offered exit mechanisms for those
employers unwilling to adhere to collective agreements, undermining
collective regulation in practice.
Tripartite Social Pacts: A Difficult Challenge
Tripartite concertation was never an established instrument in Greece.
While attempts at consultation between the state, employers and labour
were often made, they were never consistently pursued but tended to be
of an ad hoc nature. Moreover, the state usually initiated such consulta-
tion in order to gain union consent to particular policy initiatives, never
in order to create a permanent policy forum (Gabroglou et al., 2001;
Kouzis, 2000). Thus such efforts came to be treated with suspicion,
particularly by the unions. During the past two decades there have indeed
been more systematic efforts to establish tripartite concertation, but with
limited success. Two recent efforts stand out, directed at achieving
reforms in labour market organization and social security.
In 1997 the government invited union and employer representatives to
negotiations on the themes of growth, competitiveness and employment.
After seven months of dialogue a ‘confidence pact’ was signed between
the labour confederations of the private and public sector, employers’
associations and government. Its terms were to be taken into account in
the adoption of the new labour legislation and included 12 points,
covering public investment as a means of creating jobs, improved skills
training, active labour policies, and structural changes in the labour
market designed to combat unemployment. In addition, the partners
agreed to wage moderation. The pact largely excluded issues on which
there were major disagreements, or referred to them only in very general
terms. In particular, the proposal for increased labour flexibility, which
was supported by employers but opposed by unions, was not included.
However, the government included labour flexibility in legislation intro-
duced in 1998, provoking fierce labour protests. The new law set the
framework for part-time employment and flexible working-time
arrangements. In practice, however, many of its clauses remained inactive,
particularly those on flexible work time, because they could not be imple-
mented without prior agreement between unions and management
(Mouriki, 2001).
In 2000 the social partners were once more invited to present their
views on employment and unemployment. The central issue was again
the organization of work time, but agreement could still not be reached
and GSEE withdrew from the negotiations. The government introduced
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a new law unilaterally, designed to enhance flexibility in working-time
arrangements and to regulate overtime and redundancies. This was criti-
cized by both labour and employers, but for opposite reasons: the unions
believed that it would lead to the deregulation of labour, while employ-
ers believed that it introduced new rigidities and would increase labour
costs.
A similar fate followed efforts to reform the social security system.
This issue was on the agenda for many years: the system was highly
fragmented and delivered very unequal benefits to different occupational
groups and different generations, and there were widespread doubts as to
its viability (Matsanganis, 2002). In 2001 the centre-left PASOK govern-
ment put forward a reform plan, and invited unions and employers to
discuss the proposed changes. These would have raised the retirement age
to 65 for all employees and reduced the final entitlements for most. The
reforms would have streamlined the pension benefits for most lower-paid
employees, without, however, radically changing the way the social
security system is organized. Both GSEE and ADEDY rejected the
proposals outright, and a massive wave of strikes followed, after which
the government was forced to withdraw the proposal.
One year later unions and employers’ organizations were invited to
discuss the reform of the social security system from scratch. However,
a climate of mutual suspicion had already been established, making
serious negotiations impossible. Following inconclusive consultations
with the unions, in June 2002 the government introduced a reform bill
which contained much more limited reforms than the initial proposals.
Despite this, both the public and private sector unions disagreed and
called for a general strike. The government proceeded unilaterally and
introduced the proposed reform of the social security system.
These failures to achieve tripartite policy-making reflected in part the
lack of trust between social partners and the absence of a culture that
promotes dialogue and consensus. Social actors were accustomed to
influencing the state through their particularistic ties with political
actors rather than through official channels of consultation. For unions,
reaching a compromise was made more difficult by the partisan
divisions that run across the labour movement and the close connection
between political parties and union leaderships. As union organizations
affiliated with opposition political parties almost always opposed
reforms proposed by the government, even those unions affiliated with
the ruling party were forced to adopt a more confrontational stance so
as not to be accused by other labour factions of failing to protect
workers’ rights.
However, the absence of institutions promoting consensus and nego-
tiation was not the only factor inhibiting concertation and successful
social pacts. As evidence from other countries indicates, such institutional
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supports are neither sufficient nor always a necessary condition for
concertation to be achieved. Introducing reforms that are likely to lead
to diminished benefits for large sections of the labour force are a difficult
endeavour even in countries where concertation has been the norm in the
past. In the 1990s, social pacts on labour market and social security
reforms were more often achieved in countries like Italy or Ireland
without a strong tradition of concertation (Siegel, 2005). This shows that
while past institutional arrangements influence actors’ assessments,
changing circumstances will incline them to reassess their policy options
and to weigh the opportunities and costs of entering into concerted
policy-making.
Unions in Greece had much to lose by accepting the proposed reforms,
given that these were highly unpopular among their members. Moreover,
they were not offered anything substantial in return. Conversely, they
knew that they could exert greater pressure on the government through
confrontation than at the negotiating table, where they also had to face
the employers’ side. Unions retained close ties to the political party
system while their strength was greatest in public enterprises, giving them
the power to veto many government initiatives. In contrast, their position
vis-a-vis private sector employers was rather weak, which partly explains
why they have opted out of an adversarial strategy in bipartite collective
bargaining.
The final outcome of these reform efforts reflects to a greater extent
the tensions present and the political stakes confronting the government.
The fact that, for the most part, it introduced much more moderate
reforms than initially intended reflected the political costs of each
solution and the relative power exercised by the various groups affected
by the proposed measures. As pointed out by Kitschelt et al. (1999),
mass-party organizations and networks of clientilism hinder changes that
are likely to affect important constituencies. In Greece the clientilist
organization of politics has meant that policies privileged certain groups
over others, in ways that were neither in accordance with market criteria,
nor based on a rationale for social equity and redistribution of income,
but reflected ties to the ruling party (Petmezidou-Tzoulouvi, 1992;
Sotiropoulos, 2003). The fact that unions were able to resist reforms put
forward by the government, and particularly those concerning the social
security system, must be understood in light of the particularities of the
political party system and the clientilist ties formed with sections of
labour. The proposed changes of the social security system would have
particularly affected those groups that formed the backbone of the union
movement in Greece, namely public utility employees and the banking
sector, which were also traditionally affiliated with the ruling socialist
party. In addition they threatened the benefits enjoyed by a number of
powerful professional groups. Restricting the benefits enjoyed by these
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sectors of labour entailed a high political cost, which largely explains why
the government did not proceed with its initial proposals.
While both employer and union behaviour was influenced by prior
institutional arrangements and ideological preferences that made pact-
building a very difficult endeavour, the outcome might have been other-
wise if power relations and political alignments were different, and if
social actors had been forced to rethink their options. At the same time
the ability of unions to resist many of the intended changes cannot be
explained in terms of power relations alone. Unions in Greece are, for
reasons mentioned in a previous section, not very strong in a strictly
market sense. Thus the capacity to block adjustment policies must be seen
in terms of both the relative strength of sections of labour and their links
to the political system. This factor raised the costs of introducing un-
popular reforms, which explains why change has been so slow. It also
explains in part why the unions did not feel pressured to enter into a
process of political exchange.
Comparing Results Across Europe
Recent pressures towards the deregulation and decentralization of indus-
trial relations and cutbacks in social spending have left no country un-
affected. Nevertheless, not all countries responded in the same way.
Moves towards greater deregulation and decentralization have gone
furthest in LMEs, while in CMEs and state-led market economies the
outcomes vary. While in many ways these countries have also moved
towards greater liberalization, it is significant that in other respects
greater coordination seems to have been achieved.
In Europe, changes have gone furthest in the UK, where low institu-
tionalization of non-market forces has facilitated the unilateral action of
employers and government in introducing further decentralization and
deregulation of industrial relations and working conditions. The role of
trade unions has largely been restricted to collective bargaining at enter-
prise level, but bargaining coverage has fallen sharply and individual
contracts are becoming the norm. Welfare benefits have been reduced and
market mechanisms increasingly determine industrial relations.
In CMEs such sweeping changes have been prevented and govern-
ments have been more eager to bring about reforms in a concerted way;
but this has not always been possible. On the whole, it has been relatively
easier to reach agreement on a collective bargaining strategy and struc-
ture than to deal with pressures to reform the social security system or
to bring about greater labour market flexibility. Even though decentral-
izing tendencies have not been totally avoided, with the exception of
Sweden, most countries have not radically altered their collective
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bargaining structures and in some cases there has been a shift towards
greater coordination.
Germany had for a long time resisted pressures for change but in the
1990s the dual effects of global competition and the costs of unification
put increasing strain on existing arrangements. While changes towards a
greater market orientation can be detected, the main features of the
system have not been altered. Collective bargaining at sectoral level has
been maintained as the dominant form of negotiation, while industrial
relations remain for the most part cooperative. The persistence of collec-
tive bargaining arrangements in Germany can be explained by the fact
that the majority of employers continue to favour existing arrangements
as a source of stability and social peace. There are, however, increasing
tendencies for sections of labour to be left outside the scope of collective
bargaining, particularly because many small employers have opted out of
the process, especially in the East. As a result a dual labour market is
increasingly evident (Thelen and Kume, 2003).
While consensus continues to characterize collective bargaining,
efforts to reform the social security system and bring about greater flexi-
bility in employment relations through tripartite policy-making have
been unsuccessful. In the past it was customary for changes on such issues
to be piecemeal and implemented following bilateral negotiations with
government. In 1996, an initiative was made to develop formal tripartite
concertation, following the offer by the largest trade union to accept
wage restraint in exchange for employment creation measures and the
maintenance of welfare benefits. The Kohl government sought to take
forward this ‘alliance for jobs’ but added to the agenda its own plans for
welfare retrenchment, and the talks broke down. The Schröder govern-
ment elected in 1998 revitalized the alliance, in a new effort to bring about
reforms through tripartite concertation. Though the alliance formally
continued until 2002, little was achieved partly because the sense of crisis
that pushed unions in other countries to consent to reforms was absent.
Moreover, the institutional legacy of welfare corporatism paradoxically
inhibited a tripartite social pact, because it provided unions with a veto
role in government policies and accustomed them to making concessions
only when offered something in return. It has also been easier for
German unions to accept piecemeal changes through less official channels
of bilateral consultation than to agree to far-reaching ‘package deal’
reforms, in part because the sectoral organization of German unions
makes it hard for them to determine a common strategy (Hassel, 2001).
Italy has gone the furthest in bringing about change through concer-
tation and pact-building: surprisingly, given its long history of adversar-
ial industrial relations and the weak institutionalization of collective
bargaining and policy-making. In 1993, against a background of political
and economic crisis, the first ‘technocratic’ (non-partisan) government
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led by Amato promoted an agreement between unions, employers and
government, which committed unions on moderate wage increases and
abolished the cost-of-living sliding scale (scala mobile). In exchange, it
replaced the fragmented bargaining processes with a more hierarchical
and coordinated system, allowing unions a greater say in policy-making.
In 1995, the second technocratic government led by Dini made one of its
priorities the reform of the pensions system. In contrast to the first
Berlusconi government which it replaced, it succeeded in mobilizing the
necessary support to bring about reforms. This was achieved by bringing
unions into the policy-making process and taking into account many of
their concerns, including their wish to minimize the losses for older
workers (Regini and Regalia, 1997). Unions, for their part, undertook the
task of persuading their rank and file of the necessity for change, and
referendums were held across the country on the issue (Baccaro, 2002).
Employers disagreed early on, demanding more radical changes, and left
the process; the reform was thus based on a bilateral agreement between
the unions and government. The following year, however, a tripartite
employment pact was signed, introducing greater labour market flexi-
bility in exchange for measures to combat unemployment.
The Italian and Greek cases share many similarities but also display
important differences. Both countries had a tradition of adversarial
industrial relations and unions plagued by partisan divisions. Economic
pressures and growing insecurity among workers created doubts about
the continuing capacity of unions to defend rank-and-file demands. The
need for greater stability to meet new challenges led the government to
enhance the institutional role of labour, while in exchange unions
conceded wage moderation. Employers, too, consented in an effort to
gain the desired stability. The process was facilitated by the crisis situ-
ation stemming from a series of political scandals, poor economic
performance and the urgent need to meet the Maastricht convergence
criteria and join the euro. The latter, coupled with the low returns of
previous adversarial relations and the low institutionalization of bargain-
ing arrangements, facilitated institutional change, leading to greater
coordination of industrial relations.
Italian and Greek unions reacted differently to attempts at pact-
building. The different responses should be attributed primarily to the
different political climates that prevailed in the two countries, which led
unions to interpret differently the alternative costs and benefits of
consenting to the proposed reforms. Italian unions had fewer chances to
exert political pressure to stop the reforms, in part because the techno-
cratic government that came to power in 1995 was less susceptible to such
pressure. Moreover, the crisis that prevailed in the political system and
the economy was so severe as to persuade the unions that it was in their
interests to compromise in order not to lose more in the long run. The
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fact that the pensions agreement took place only between unions and
government legitimized the processes in the eyes of rank-and-file
workers. Despite organizational divisions, all main unions shared
common perspectives: they were persuaded that the social security
reform was the best compromise, and also saw a long-term gain from
being included in the policy process.
In contrast, the Greek unions felt that they could veto social security
reforms because of their close ties to the ruling party, which they could
use to exert pressure on the government, while the strength of partisan
conflicts made internal opposition more effective. The lack of political
consensus over the proposed reforms made it harder for unions to sell
these to their rank and file, which explains why they were rejected even
on those occasions when their introduction appeared inevitable.
Moreover, the Greek government made no systematic attempt to engage
in dialogue with unions and failed to persuade them that they would gain
something in return. While Greece and Germany differ greatly in their
institutional characteristics and the organizational basis of trade unions,
in both countries the latter decided not to accept the reforms promoted
through tripartite consultation, in large part because of their capacity to
veto government decisions. In neither country were the unions persuaded
that they had something to gain by entering into a tripartite agreement.
Conclusions
While neo-institutionalist analysis can go a long way in interpreting
actors’ responses in different countries, it has difficulties interpreting
changes in institutional behaviour. In order to have a better understand-
ing of actors’ responses to change we need to combine institutional
analysis with a more actor-centred approach. The examples presented
above show that while past historical and institutional legacies help to
shape actors’ interpretation of reality and constrain their behaviour, there
are still choices to be made. Moreover, historical legacies during periods
of crisis might prove a springboard for dramatic changes. This is demon-
strated in the case of Italy and to a lesser extent Greece, which have
undergone some of the more radical changes in collective bargaining and
social policy-making. In both countries, the shared feeling that previous
arrangements no longer delivered the desired results facilitated shifts in
institutional behaviour.
On the whole, centralized or coordinated collective bargaining and
tripartite social pacts are more likely in countries where non-market
mechanisms have always had a more central coordinating role. But this
in and of itself does not guarantee that they will in fact occur. It has been
easier to maintain or even enhance centralized or coordinated collective
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bargaining than to negotiate tripartite pacts. This can be explained by the
fact that both unions and employers have so far felt that they have some-
thing to gain by compromising on collective bargaining arrangements,
whereas social pacts on welfare and labour market reforms imply more
fundamental concessions on the part of unions — in effect, they can
represent a zero-sum game. In this sense the signing of such pacts consti-
tutes, in most cases, a deviation from previous practices, and the decision
to accept such a compromise involves primarily a strategic choice. Social
pacts between unions, employers and the state are more likely to be
achieved when unions judge that the alternative of not consenting would
have more far-reaching negative outcomes in the long run. In contrast,
where unions maintain a strong veto role in government decisions they
are less likely to concede.
NOTES
1 The article takes into account developments up to the spring of 2004, when
the conservative New Democracy party was elected to office.
2 Figures are provided by the mediation and arbitration service, OMED.
Arbitration agreements have increased since 2001, reaching 23 percent in
2003, but they remain far below the pre-1990 level.
REFERENCES
Baccaro, L. (2002) ‘The Construction of “Democratic” Corporatism in Italy’,
Politics and Society 30(2): 327–57.
Berger, S. and Dore, R. (1996) National Diversity and Global Capitalism.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Boyer, R. (1997) ‘French Statism at the Crossroads’, in C. Crouch and W.
Streeck (eds) Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, pp. 71–101. London:
Sage.
Crouch, C. and Streeck, W. (1997) ‘Introduction: The Future of Capitalist
Diversity’ in C. Crouch and W. Streeck (eds) Political Economy of Modern
Capitalism, pp. 1–18. London: Sage.
Ebbinghaus, B. and Hassel, A. (2000) ‘Striking Deals: Concertation in Reform
of Continental European Welfare States’, Journal of European Public Policy
7(1): 44–56.
EIROnline (2003) ‘Greece: Strike figures examined’, URL: http://www.eiro.euro
found.eu.int/2003/02/feature/gr032102f.html.
Ferner, A. and Hyman, R. (1998) ‘Introduction: Towards European Industrial
Relations?’, in A. Ferner and R. Hyman (eds) Changing Industrial Relations
in Europe, pp. xi–xxvi. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gabroglou, S.P., Gazon, E. and Mouriki, A. (2001) ‘Social Dialogue and
Productivity’, in Gabroglou, S.P. and Kikilias, I. (eds) Work Organisation and
New Forms of Employment in Greece and Europe, pp. 193–220. Athens:
Sakkoulas.
Zambarloukou: Collective Bargaining and Social Pacts
227
Gianitsis, T. (1988) Entry in the European Community and its Consequences for
Industry and Foreign Trade. Athens: Mediterranean Studies Foundation.
Golden, M., Wallerstein, M. and Lange, P. (1999) ‘Postwar Union Organisation
and Industrial Relations’, in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and
J.D. Stephens (eds) Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism,
pp. 194–230. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001) ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’,
in P.A. Hall and D. Soskice (eds) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, pp. 1–68. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hassel, A. (2001) ‘The Problem of Political Exchange in Complex Governance
Systems: The Case of Germany’s Alliance for Jobs’, European Journal of
Industrial Relations 7(3): 307–26.
Hollingsworth, J.R. (2002) ‘On Institutional Embeddedness’, in
J.R. Hollingsworth, K.H. Müller and E.J. Hollingsworth (eds) Advancing 
Socio-economics: An Institutionalist Perspective, pp. 87–108. Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield.
Hollingsworth, J.R. and Boyer, R. (1997) ‘Coordination of Economic Actors
and Social Systems of Production’, in J.R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer (eds)
Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions, pp. 1–48.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G., Stephens, J.D. and Kitschelt, H. (1999)
‘Convergence and Divergence in Advanced Capitalist Democracies’, in
P. Lange, G. Marks and J.D. Stephens (eds) Continuity and Change in
Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 427–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Koukoules, G. (1997) ‘Retrospect on a Controversial Past’, in Kasimati (ed.)
The Greek Union Movement in the End of the 20th Century, pp. 25–84.
Athens: Gutenberg.
Kouzis, Y. (2000) ‘The Impact of EMU on Labour Relations’, Epitheorisi
Ergasiakon Sheseon, 18: 57–66.
Kouzis, Y. (2002) ‘Employment and Labour Relations in Greece: Reality,
Trends and Prospects’, Tetradia tou INE, October.
Lymberaki, A. and Tsakalotos, E. (2002) ‘Reforming the Economy Without
Society: Social and Institutional Constraints to Economic Reform in Post-
1974 Greece’, New Political Economy 7(1): 93–114.
Matsanganis, M. (2002) ‘Yet Another Piece of Pension Reform in Greece’, South
European Society and Politics 7(3): 109–22.
Mavrogordatos, G. (1988) Between Pityokamtes and Prokroustes: Occupational
Organisations in Contemporary Greece. Athens: Odysseas.
Mouriki, A. (2001) ‘Labour Relations and Social Dialogue in Greece: The
Difficult Path from State Custody to Independence’, in The Social Portrait of
Greece, pp. 145–52. Athens: EKKE.
North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Petmezidou-Tzoulouvi, M. (1992) Social Inequalities and Social Policies.
Athens: Exantas.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(2)
228
Regini, M. (2000) ‘Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses of
European Economies to Globalization’, Politics and Society 28(1): 5–33.
Regini, M. (2003) ‘Tripartite Concertation and Varieties of Capitalism’,
European Journal of Industrial Relations 9(3): 251–63.
Regini, M. and Regalia, I. (1997) ‘Employers, Unions and the State: The
Resurgence of Concertation in Italy’, West European Politics 20(1): 220–30.
Rhodes, M. (1997) ‘Globalization, Labour Markets and Welfare States. A Future
of Competitive Corporatism?’, in M. Rhodes and Y. Meny (eds) The Future
of Welfare, A Future of Competitive Corporatism?, pp. 178–203. London:
Macmillan.
Royo, S. (2002) ‘A New Century of Corporatism? Corporatism in Spain and
Portugal’, West European Politics 25(3): 77–104.
Schmidt, A.V. (2002) The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Siegel, A.N. (2005) ‘Social Pacts Revisited: Competitive Concertation and
Complex Causality in Negotiated Welfare State Reforms’, European Journal
of Industrial Relations 11(1): 107–26.
Soskice, D. (1990) ‘Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in
Advanced Industrialized Countries’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6(4):
36–61.
Soskice, D. (1999) ‘Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and
Uncoordinated Economies in the 1980s and 1990s’, in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange,
G. Marks and J.D. Stephens (eds) Continuity and Change in Contemporary
Capitalism, pp. 101–35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sotiropoulos, D. (2003) ‘Facets of Babylonia: Interpretations of the
Development of the Welfare State in Greece’, in D. Venieris and
C. Papatheodorou (eds) Social Policy in Greece: Challenges and Prospects,
pp. 89–132. Athens: Ellinika Grammata.
Thelen, K. and Kume, I. (2003) ‘The Future of Nationally Embedded
Capitalism’, in K. Yamamura and W. Streeck (eds) The End of Diversity,
pp. 183–211. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Tsoukalas, K. (1987) State Society and Work. Athens: Themelio.
Zambarloukou, S. (1997) The State and Union Organisation in Greece, 1936–90.
Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas.
STELLA ZAMBARLOUKOU is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the
University of Crete.
ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, University of Crete, 74100 Rethymno,
Greece. [email: zamba@social.soc.uoc.gr]
Zambarloukou: Collective Bargaining and Social Pacts
229
